On the Infinity of Debt by Pellizzoni, Luigi
Continental Thought & Theory
A journal of intellectual freedom&C TT
Volume 1 | Issue 2: Debt and Value  
  406-429 | ISSN: 2463-333X




Abstract: A striking aspect of current debt is that it seems characterized by 
limitlessness in space and time. Benjamin’s account of capitalism as a permanent 
cult gives a clue to its peculiar infinity. Debt shows the traits of a messianic time. 
More precisely, it partakes in the increasingly dominative temporality of pre-
emption, where a catastrophic future is endlessly postponed by a homeopathic 
kathecon which in its action remoulds also the past. Disentangling from this 
logic through its intensification can hardly be successful, if anything because 
the capitalist engine is running idle at faster and faster speed. Alternatively, 
one should look for an interruption, a disengagement from the thrust to infinite 
valorization, in the direction of inoperosity, as a possibility that messianic time 
also discloses. To redeem our enslavement to debt, however, we have not to look 
at our relation with money, but at our relation with the world.
Keywords: debt, pre-emption, messianic kathecon, Benjamin, Agamben
Introduction 
That time is crucial to debt may be a trivial evidence. What is striking, however, 
is that debt seems today characterized by limitlessness in space and time. 
Various explanations have been proposed. Here I elaborate on the idea that the 
temporality of debt corresponds to the messianic temporality of pre-emption. 
Both these notions, pre-emption and the messianic, are intensely discussed. I 
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will not address in a comprehensive way either this debate or the one about 
debt. The following is rather an exploration of the connections between these 
problem-fields.
 I start with reflecting on the case for the anthropological primacy of debt, 
its limits in accounting for the temporality implied in its capitalist versions, and 
the interest of Benjamin’s account of capitalism as a cult provided with a peculiar 
type of infinity. The second section focuses on the politics of time implied in 
different forms of anticipation, paying special attention to pre-emption, as an 
increasingly dominative logic which, as I argue in the third section, constitutes 
the backbone of infinite debt. This logic is that of a messianic kathecon, 
committed to postponing a catastrophic future by applying the same evil it 
seeks to fight. The fourth section elaborates on two possible strategies vis-à-vis 
runaway capitalism: intensifying its speed, or searching for a way to disconnect 
an engine which is running idle at faster and faster pace; that is, to give shape 
to inoperosity, as a possibility that messianic time also discloses. The conclusion 
suggests that, to redeem our enslavement to debt, we should not look so much 
at our relation with money, as at our (proprietary) relation with things. To this 
purpose, however, neither the notion of ‘use’ nor the notion of ‘administration’ 
provide any clear-cut indication. 
 
The infinity of debt
Scholars dwelling on debt are often puzzled by its time framework under 
capitalist rule. This emerges, for example, from the case for the anthropological 
primacy of debt. Rather than representing ‘an exchange that has not been 
brought to completion’,1 the asymmetry between creditor and debtor 
constitutes, it is argued, the archetypal social relation.2 This has direct 
implications on temporality. If the time of barter or contract is a present 
condensed in crucial instants (the hands-shaking of the parties, the exchange of 
commodities), debt, as the promise of something, entangles the present with the 
future.
 The risk of regarding debt as the archetype of social relations, however, 
is that an anthropological framing may obscure crucial historical differences. 
If the human is accounted for as ontologically defective and incomplete, 
and the communal as marked by the indebtedness of the single towards the 
collective,3 debt is subsumed to the sacrificial structure of the social tie, as an 
inextinguishable obligation for the gift of life towards gods or ancestors. Yet, 
as Deleuze and Guattari4  have stressed, in archaic societies debt consists of 
mobile and finite blocs. Moreover, ethnographic research indicates that sacrifice 
is unknown to various cultures.5 Thus, infinite debt does not represent an 
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anthropological universal. The infinity of debt is the offspring of the totalizing 
ordering of individuals, collectives and transcendence typical of empires, states 
and monotheistic religions. 
 The question, then, is the specific infinity of debt in capitalist time. In 
this regard, it is interesting to compare Weber’s and Benjamin’s accounts of 
the ‘spirit of capitalism’. That capitalism today increasingly extracts value 
from people’s creativity, simultaneously engaging their cognitive capacities 
and value commitments,6 makes immediately conspicuous Weber’s point 
about the ‘elective affinity’ between self-finalized accumulation and an ascetic 
conduct where work is similarly self-finalized, as a manifestation of grace.7 It 
makes, however, also problematic Weber’s corollary thesis of the ‘iron cage’ – a 
means-ends rationality that, once established, does not need any further value 
commitment. This possibly explains the growing interest Walter Benjamin’s 
1921 fragment on Capitalism as Religion is enjoying.8 For Benjamin, capitalism 
is ‘not merely, as Weber believes, a formation conditioned by religion, but an 
essentially religious phenomenon’; a cult that has no dogma or theology, yet 
asks for permanent celebration, engendering ‘a vast sense of guilt that is unable 
to find relief’ or atonement, and expands ‘to include God’ in a generalized state 
of desperation.9
 Benjamin depicts in this way a runaway capitalism whose infinity is 
of a different type compared with the ‘end of history’ which the iron cage 
argument envisaged, much before Fukuyama’s (in)famous celebration. Moreover, 
he accompanies his account of capitalism with corrosive comments about 
Nietzsche, Freud and Marx – the alleged ‘masters of suspicion’10  about capitalist 
modernity. They actually embrace capitalism, Benjamin claims. Their theories 
push capitalism’s immanent logic (of debt/guilt) to the extreme consequences, 
if under the assumption that intensification is bound to engender an eventual 
rupture and overcoming (the overman, the subject ‘freed’ from the repressed, 
or socialism). For Benjamin, on the contrary, an actual ‘apocalyptic “leap”’, 
away from capitalism, would require ‘conversion, atonement, purification and 
penance’.11 What is needed, in other words, is not intensification, but rather 
interruption, a radical departure from the debt/guilt logic. I will come back later 
to this point.
 In short, the permanent cult of capitalism entails a present deeply 
entrenched in the future, or better, a future completely mortgaged by the 
present. The present-future nexus finds expression today in different types of 
anticipation. Of these, as we shall see, one has been taking growing momentum 
and can be regarded as constituting the backbone of infinite debt.
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Politics of time: from prevention to pre-emption
The notion of  ‘politics of time’, or ‘chronopolitics’, refers to the way of relating 
past, present and future to each other as crucial to the social order, hence a 
field of power struggles.12 As Luhmann13 has pointed out, this applies especially 
to modern societies, because modernity’s orientation to the ‘new’, that is to a 
futurity conceived as open rather than a repetition of the past, an accidental 
deviation from established patterns, or the end of time, creates the condition 
for higher complexity in the relationship with time. If future is a horizon of 
possibilities, the connection between ‘present futures’ (that is, the present views 
of potential futures) and ‘future presents’ (that is, the states of affairs brought 
about by the chain of events) becomes problematic. Such connection can be 
looser or tighter, according to different degrees of openness (‘futurization’) and 
closure (‘defuturization’). With its concept of the ‘new’, modernity futurized 
time to unprecedented levels, which required, for society to hold together, novel 
ways of controlling indeterminacy. The development of probability, statistics, 
insurance and social security responded to such need.14 Statistics ‘defuturizes 
the future without identifying it with only one chain of events’.15 The present 
becomes in this way an operational time for establishing a relationship with the 
future. ‘Anticipation’ becomes a crucial task. A task which is not just a matter of 
appropriate techniques but of political choices, since to make future actionable 
‘certain lives may have to be abandoned, damaged or destroyed in order to 
protect, save or care for [more valued forms of] life’.16 Indeed, if future offers 
a surplus of possibilities, anticipation takes inevitably the form of a privative 
negation of some of them.17 Future, therefore, takes political relevance as the 
(un)desirability of certain states of affairs; the need to separate promise from 
threat. 
 The rise of complexity, systems instability, non-linearity, contingency and 
open-endedness in a variety of fields (chemistry, ecology, biology, cybernetics, 
finance etc.) can be regarded as inaugurating, between the 1970s and 1980s, 
a new politics of time. At its origins lies a double crisis: energy scarcity and 
mounting environmental threats on one side; stagflation and declining profits 
on the other.18 A crisis to which capitalism has responded with the post-Fordist 
reorganization and the promotion of a new type of subjectivity, less ‘centred’ 
compared with the modern account of individuality, but nonetheless – or, better, 
thanks to that – capable of regarding itself as a capital susceptible to endless 
maximization.19 Futurization takes the shape of irredeemable indeterminacy, and 
defuturization turns to non-calculative approaches. This immediately reminds 
the precautionary principle. Yet, as remarks Pat O’Malley, ‘an extensive and 
immensely influential managerial literature appearing since the early 1980s […] 
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celebrates uncertainty as the technique of entrepreneurial creativity, […] the fluid 
art of the possible’.20 The future is estimated ‘in much the same way that people 
do engaging in extreme sports: that is by accumulating information, relying 
on experience, using practiced judgment and rules of thumb, and so on’.21 In 
this context danger and insecurity are deemed ‘at the heart of what is positive 
and constructive’.22 Non-predictive decision making allegedly enables to stand 
volatility, uncertainty and errors: ‘to do things without understanding them – and 
to do them well’.23 
 So, the rise of unpredictability and systems instability does not lead only 
to precaution, but also to approaches that draw opposite conclusions about 
indeterminacy – not as undermining but as enhancing purposeful action.24 What 
sort of anticipation corresponds to this outlook? 
Let’s start with a most classic type of anticipation: prevention. Prevention 
‘operates in an objectively knowable world in which uncertainty is a function 
of a lack of information, and in which events run a predictable, linear course 
from cause to effect’.25 Threats can be reliably identified and assessed, and 
sound measures worked out in order to avoid their realization. The ontology of 
prevention is dualist: on one side there is the knowing subject; on the other, the 
world acted upon. Present and future are sequentially connected. 
Another well-known form of anticipation is deterrence. Similarly to prevention, 
deterrence assumes that the world can be objectively known. Yet, the world 
is not simply taken to ‘respond’ (within known margins of predictive error) to 
action, but is crafted according to what action needs in order to be effective. In 
other words, the process produces its own cause. Deterrence transforms nuclear 
annihilation from threat to actual danger. Thus, the ontology of deterrence is 
nondualist, since it assumes a reciprocal adjustment of knowledge and world. 
Moreover, deterrence assumes the reality of a future event, bound to overturn 
the social order, or life as such. For this reason the temporality of deterrence is 
not linear – but neither is it circular, as many pre- or non-modern conceptions 
of time. It rather bears resemblance with messianic time. The latter, notes 
Agamben,26 is not to be understood as the end of time but as the time of 
the end. It is a present (ho nyn Kairos: ‘the time of the now’, according to St. 
Paul) defined by a future catastrophic event (an eschaton) and a continuous 
postponement of such event, enabled by something that holds it back. This is 
the kathecon which St. Paul mentions in the Second Letter to the Thessalonians, 
as a force that prevents the manifestation of the Antichrist. A force that, as 
happens with deterrence, seems often to apply a homeopathic strategy: fighting 
evil with evil itself.27
 Precaution starts to be properly articulated around 1980. It tries to 
respond to the question of what one is supposed to do when threats are 
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apprehended without being amenable to proper scientific assessment.28 When, 
in other words, the threat itself has been identified, yet the level of certainty 
needed to act on sound scientific bases is lacking, while waiting for building 
such bases is supposed to undermine the (cost-)effectiveness of action. Of 
course, given the incalculability of the threat, establishing a commensurate 
response is problematic. Hence endless controversies over whether and how is 
precaution to be implemented. The differences with prevention and deterrence, 
however, are clear. Deterrence and prevention build on certainty (full certainty 
in the first case; certainty about the limits of the unknown in the second). 
Precaution builds on irredeemable uncertainty. Moreover, contrary to deterrence, 
but similarly to prevention, the ontology of precaution is dualist. Precautionary 
action ‘is separate from the processes it acts on’.29 The world, that is, is assumed 
to proceed ‘on its own’, should precautionary action not take place, or to 
‘respond’ to such action, whereas as we have seen deterrence crafts the world 
according to its operational needs. Yet, precaution is close to deterrence as 
regards the catastrophic imaginary on which it builds (even if catastrophe can 
be triggered by long term processes rather than by a single event). Finally, the 
temporality of precaution is linear, similarly to prevention (and all the more so, 
given that the processes considered are irreversible). The catastrophe should be 
averted, rather than postponed.
 Lastly, we have pre-emption. This type of anticipation has emerged in the 
1990s and has taken growing momentum.30 Its logic is condensed in two (in)
famous statements, one by G.W. Bush, the other attributed to Bush’s aide Karl 
Rove.
If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too 
long. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and 
confront the worst threats before they emerge […]. And our security 
will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be 
ready for pre-emptive action when necessary to defend our liberty 
and to defend our lives.31
We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. 
And while you’re studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we’ll 
act again, creating other new realities.32
Similarly to precaution, pre-emption builds on uncertainty, but of an even 
deeper sort. While with precaution the threat is known, even if knowledge is 
insufficient to describe it robustly enough, with pre-emption the threat has not 
emerged yet. It is actually indeterminate, so it’s not possible or meaningful to 
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distinguish between epistemic and ontic aspects of uncertainty. The ontology 
of pre-emption is resolutely nondualist. Moreover, uncertainty as a trigger of 
action puts pre-emption in opposition to deterrence. Yet, a shared aspect is that 
both build on the future actualization of the threat. Like deterrence, therefore, 
the temporality of pre-emption is messianic, an in-between the past and a 
future event that is indeterminate yet certain, and action takes the shape of a 
force that continuously postpones the event. Furthermore, pre-emptive action 
is ‘incitatory’: ‘Since the threat is proliferative in any case, your best option is 
to help make it proliferate more - that is, hopefully, more on your own terms’.33 
The indeterminacy of the threat expands the agent’s room of manoeuvre to an 
extent that is alien to any of the other types of anticipation. While prevention 
seeks to save the normal course of the events and deterrence is constrained in a 
spiralling repetition, pre-emption shares with precaution the idea that the course 
of the events has to be significantly altered, ‘creating new facts before it is too 
late’.34 Yet, contrary to precaution, pre-emption works in a fully plastic world, 
where knowledge and reality can be adjusted to each other. In this context, 
‘creating new facts’ translates into a constant experimentation, endless testing 
and prodding, which rules out the very notion of error. On one side, being 
based on potential threats, action cannot be properly proven wrong. On the 
other, pre-emptive action creates the reality that demonstrates such action was 
sound since the beginning. As Bush claimed in 2005,35 ‘some may agree with 
my decision to remove Saddam Hussein from power, but all of us can agree that 
the world’s terrorists have now made Iraq a central front in the war on terror’. 
Thus, removing Saddam Hussein was the right thing to do, since in this way Iraq 
has become what it always could have been. ‘Truth, in this new world order, is by 
nature retroactive’,36 bypassing, as Bush’s aide said, any ‘judicious study’ of facts.
 In short, pre-emption produces simultaneously the future and the past. 
If messianic time is ‘the time that contracts itself’,37 pre-emption contracts in 
the present both the future, through its indefinite postponement, and the past, 
‘recapitulated’ in the features it must have had since the beginning. In this 
temporality indeterminacy works differently from prevention and precaution. 
With both, truth is an anticipated future that retroacts on the present as a 
justifying clause. Action is legitimated on the grounds of knowledge deemed 
sufficiently reliable (even if according to a different rationale), yet liabilities for 
unforeseeable accidents and ‘unintended effects’ can be rejected on the basis 
that scientific knowledge is limited and perfectible (this is what Ulrich Beck 
calls ‘organized irresponsibility’). To some extent this applies also to deterrence, 
should the fatal button be pressed (or self-activated) for an unforeseeable 
concatenation of factors, as a feeble justification of the catastrophe to the few 
survivors. With pre-emption, instead, truth becomes a recapitulated past short 
413
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
Volume 1, Issue 2: Debt and Value
circuited with the future. In this framework not only ‘unintended effects’ are not 
something to apologise for – they may even open up unforeseen opportunities38 
– but one may ask whether the distinction between intended and unintended 
effect still holds, given the radical experimentalism of the approach. 
Debt as pre-emption
To sum up, pre-emption has a peculiarly generative or proliferative dynamic:
It compensates for the absence of an actual cause by producing an 
actual effect in its place. […] This movement of actualization […] is 
not only self-propelling but also effectively, indefinitely, ontologically 
productive, because it works from a virtual cause whose potential no 
single actualization exhausts.39
Incidentally, this confirms Luhmann’s claim that, the more the future is taken 
to be indeterminate, the more the efforts shift ‘from predicting to creating [it]. 
This sounds like: if you cannot see, you have to act!’.40 It would be a mistake, 
however, to regard pre-emption as pertaining uniquely to the military. On the 
contrary, one finds it spreading – for example in the field of innovation. Not 
only technological expectations and anticipations play a growing role, with 
consequent tightened, or ‘contracted’, dynamics of action and retroaction,41 
but innovation seems increasingly to be driven by a pre-emptive rationale. This 
regards first and foremost the potential of creativity for social change.42 Yet, it 
regards also how the handling of innovation is addressed. Consider, for example, 
what Dupuy and Grinbaum say about nanotechnologies (but the same could 
be said about GMOs, the Internet of Things, new prosthetics, brain-computer 
interfaces and many other new and emergent technologies):
One should wish to obtain at every moment of time an image of 
the future sufficiently catastrophic to be repulsive and sufficiently 
credible to trigger the actions that would block its realization. […]  
A damage that will not occur must be lived with and treated as if 
inevitable.43 
To address the threat, in other words, you have to ‘incite’ it (for example, the 
realization of self-assembling nanodevices).44 Another example comes from 
geoengineering, namely solar radiation management (SRM). SRM aims to 
address global warming and the threat of climate turbulences by reducing the 
net incoming solar radiation, either by deflecting sunlight or by increasing the 
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reflectivity (albedo) of the atmosphere, clouds or the Earth’s surface. Whatever 
the techniques adopted,45 since one intervenes in a chaotic and constantly 
evolving system, there is no clear distinction between epistemic and ontic 
uncertainty, and the intervention can only be highly tentative and experimental.46 
The idea, again, seems that one has to generate the threat (climate turbulence) 
in order to make it somewhat actionable. Whatever the results, moreover, climate 
engineers, like nanotechnologists, can never be proven wrong, since they will 
have produced effects that could always have occurred.
 Finally, and most importantly in the context of this paper, the rationale 
of pre-emption shines through the current regime of debt. The instauration 
of such regime is a result of, and crucial to, the capitalist reply to the 1970s 
crisis. It is, more precisely, the outcome of a combination of monetary policies, 
wage deflation, reduction of public services and corporate tax reductions.47 
The resulting growing turbulence is consistent with the reversal of the view 
about indeterminacy and instability at which I hinted above. Austerity is an 
homeopathic kathecon that seeks to address debt by letting it expand, taking 
default as a certain though indeterminate future (what does it mean, exactly, 
the default of a state? what is its relation with private citizens’ defaults, and with 
the collapse of a society as a whole?), while recapitulating the past in the ‘truth’ 
about prior public and private behaviours – no matter how much debt had been 
promoted, it now appears as it must have been since the beginning: culpable, 
hence worthy of adequate punishment.
 The same backbone surfaces in the most (in)famous instruments of the 
politics of debt: financial derivatives. These, as well-known, are a particular kind 
of tradable contract. Their trade value is tied to the value of other assets, from 
bulk commodities to corporate shares and currencies. With derivatives one can 
trade in the performance of an attribute of such assets, without necessarily 
trading in the asset itself.48 Derivatives quantify and trade the risk related to such 
performance. According to the logic of the homeopathic kathecon, they keep 
risk at bay by making it proliferate. Taking the example of weather derivatives, 
these are designed to hedge and trade securities contingent on unpredictable 
states of weather, either catastrophic or not. The level, timing and swings of 
temperature, rain or wind, for example, are attributes of weather (the underlying 
‘asset’) that may affect a number of enterprises, from energy companies to 
food producers. Hence, it is possible for instance to devise contracts on heating 
degree days (HDD) or cooling degree days (CDD). Investors, therefore, make 
their choice according to degrees of trust and beliefs concerning swings in 
temperature. Derivatives, thus, ‘contract’ time, short circuiting the future effect 
(the money one will get) and its past cause (the temperature swing). 
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Searching for another time
If it is possible to consider pre-emption a dispositif in the Foucauldian sense 
of the word,49 that is, an ensemble of discourses, institutional and regulatory 
arrangements, administrative measures and material devices that responds to 
an urgent need of the historical moment,50  one may ask what kind of urgency 
the rise of pre-emption seeks to address. For sure, such urgency is conveyed 
by an imaginary of emergency of expanding scope (climate change, terrorism, 
economic collapse, biblical migrations, pandemics…), the main outcome of which 
is a kathecon of unprecedented reach, aimed at moulding the whole constitution 
of the world, including its temporal ordering. 
 The expansion of debt, I submit, should be read in this perspective, 
that is, in the context of a broader governmental move that puts time at its 
centre, working simultaneously on new types of military aggression, wild 
rush to innovation and generalized indebtedness. Pre-emption requires and 
produces inextinguishable debt, for a form of life protected and promoted 
with unrestricted inventiveness. Or, debt follows a pre-emptive rationale. The 
redemption of debt is the event that would signal the end of (capitalist) time, 
while its indefinite postponement points to an intensifying extraction of value. 
Infinite debt makes the past (freedom, peace) adjust to the future (debt, war), 
the emergent ‘truth’ being that – contrary to any assumption or evidence 
about the possibility of harmony, within society and between humans and the 
biophysical world – indebtedness and fear must have been ruling since the 
beginning, as they constitute the archetype of social relations.  
 Yet, what does it mean that debt is the archetype of social relations? 
Agamben notes that the arché constitutes an a-priori, in the Foucauldian 
sense of condition of possibility of knowledge. It is the moment of arising of 
a division (between the observed condition and an ‘else’) which can disclose 
only the circumstances of its production, since ‘our way of representing the 
moment before the split is governed by the split itself’.51 This means that our 
image of human relations without debt is dictated by the presence of debt 
itself; better, given that by criticizing debt one is performing an ‘ontology of 
the present’,52 our idea of debt and our reconstruction of its origins are affected 
by the experience of debt in the current historical condition. A glimpse of what 
lies ‘before’ or ‘behind’ – hence possibly also after or beyond – debt is offered 
only by the acknowledgment of the historical and cultural dependence of any 
account of the human, including human indebtedness. Deleuze and Lazzarato 
stress this when they note the historical and cultural situatedness of infinite 
debt and its sacrificial underpinnings. Yet, taking debt itself as the archetype 
of social relations means falling prey to the ‘analytics of truth’, the search for a 
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‘true reality’ behind its historical manifestations, as it happens with claims about 
the structural infinity of debt, or the human original condition of bellum omnium 
contra omnes.
 Critique, says Foucault, means raising the question of ‘how not to be 
governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such 
an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, 
not by them’.53 It means, therefore, saying what one does not want, how things 
should not be. This may seem not much, especially in a moment in which social 
and political theory resonates with celebrations of affirmativeness – be it a plea 
for ‘affirmative biopolitics’54 or for ‘vibrant materialities’.55 Yet, at the very least, 
it means recalling that one works from within the problem-framework one is 
criticizing; hence, being careful about ways out of dominative relations which 
may end up reproducing them. 
 In regard to debt two such slippery terrains, it seems to me, are affect and 
acceleration. As for the former,  Lazzarato for example claims that questioning 
the ruling system of relations and meanings on the basis of opposed interests is 
not enough. One needs (also) to follow a ‘line of desire’, which suspends, breaks 
and neutralizes such relations and the connected thrust to infinite valorization.56 
The issue, in particular, is not fighting for the recognition of the value of work, 
but refusing work, the roles and meanings of the current division of labour. Here 
Lazzarato (as many others) draws inspiration from Deleuze and his account 
of desire as a potency of becoming and (self-)transformation.57 Foucault, on 
the contrary, is famously suspicious about the emancipatory force of desire, 
especially considering how biopower combines repressive and stimulating 
strategies.58 In fact, pre-emption builds on affect, ‘to effectively trigger a virtual 
causality. Pre-emption is when the futurity of unspecified threat is affectively 
held in the present in a perpetual state of potential emergence(y)’.59
 As for acceleration, I have recalled Benjamin’s remarks about how 
Nietzsche, Freud and Marx assume that the intensification of capitalism and 
of connected subjectivities is bound to reach a turning point. The idea of 
exiting from capitalism by ‘traversing’ it, that is, by using the forces it unleashes 
against itself, has been elaborated in many ways, often meeting with the post-
humanist theme of the human-machine integration.60 A recent take on this 
theme is Williams and Srnicek’s Manifesto for an Accelerationist Politics and their 
subsequent book Inventing the Future. The left, they complain, is today focused 
on contrasting runaway capitalism and its growing technical and organizational 
complexity by bringing politics ‘down to the human scale, to a level of temporal, 
spatial and conceptual immediacy’.61 Yet, the goal is not to reverse but to 
build on and accelerate the gains of capitalism (‘the most advanced economic 
system to date’), overcoming ‘its value system, governance structures, and mass 
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pathologies’, which dramatically limit ‘the true transformative potentials of much 
of our technological and scientific research’62 in the direction of a post-capitalist, 
post-work, post-human society. 
 Another recent take on the acceleration theme is the Ecomodernist 
Manifesto.63 Humankind, it is said here, has flourished despite growing damage 
to natural systems, where the damage is itself the consequence of human 
beings’ use of the biosphere to meet their needs and desires. To escape pending 
threats, therefore, human societies should increasingly decouple themselves 
from natural biophysical systems. We can and should do without nature: 
conservation or preservation of ‘natural areas’ is more a matter of aesthetic and 
moral commitments than of utilitarian ones. Technology replaces nature because 
it is ultimately indistinguishable from it – arguably since the beginning, there 
being no grounds to hold an ontological divide between the natural and the 
artificial, but surely in the present. 
 The analogies between the two Manifestos are evident, though they 
locate differently the source of threat – capitalism, or the biophysical world. 
The difference is not accidental. The Ecomodernist Manifesto is a product 
of the Breakthrough Institute, a think-tank (in)famous for its anti-ecologist 
standpoint and whose critique of the ‘planning fallacy’ of embedded liberalism, 
in favour of market-driven innovation within a regulatory framework ensured by 
institutions like the WTO, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund64 
expresses in almost caricatured way classic neoliberal tenets. That  the case for 
acceleration can be made from opposed political perspectives not only brings 
into question its emancipatory potentials (as Benjamin did), but suggests a 
transversal concern for the actual decline in the rate of return on investments; 
a decline that dates back to the 1970s65  and that the ‘revolution’ of ICTs and 
biotech, a massive reduction in wages and social expenditures, and the spiralling 
expansion of finance and debt have to some extent been able to conceal but not 
to reverse. If we have often ‘the strange sensation of living in a society without 
time, without possibility, without foreseeable rupture’,66 this is not because we 
are at the end of historical time but because we are caught in a ‘time of the end’, 
tightly contracted and indefinitely protracted, where the kathecon is running idle 
at faster and faster pace.
 There can be more optimistic outlooks on the messianic. If, for  example, 
climate change studies just offer reconstructions of the past or scenarios 
about the future, remaining silent on the present, then this disjointed time can 
be regarded as opening a messianic room ‘for things to be disrupted, […] a 
reconfiguration of the subject and a new, more just relationship to the past and 
future’.67 The ambivalence of the messianic transpires from St. Paul himself, at 
least as Agamben reads him. On one side St. Paul is decisive for the emergence 
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of a view of the messianic community in terms of an oikonomia rather than 
a politics,68 that is, a reality to be ‘administered’ in the time between the 
manifestation of the Messiah and the end of time. The messianic, in other words, 
is essential to the rise of the modern governmental logic, the latest expression of 
which is pre-emption. Yet, messianic time is also ‘the time that remains between 
time and its end’;69 the time of a remnant (the messianic community). Remnant 
means ‘both an excess of the all with regard to the part, and of the part with 
regard to the all’.70 It is not a portion or a residual according to the ruling division 
(between Jews and non-Jews), but a new division (Jews outwardly, according to 
flesh or law, and Jews inwardly, according to spirit). This new division defines a 
third term in respect to the preceding ones (A/non-A); a double negation (non-
non-A: a good Christian does not become a Jew, according to flesh, but rather 
a non-non-Jew, according to spirit) that cannot be subsumed to the former, 
making them inoperative without ever resolving them into a unity.71 Being a 
remnant, in other words, means to be stripped ‘of any juridical-factual property 
(circumcised/uncircumcised; free/slave; man/woman) under the form of the as 
not’.72 
 So, messianic time is an operational time but also the time when dominant 
orderings are deactivated: it is the time of the inoperative; or, the operational 
time of inoperosity. At least in Agamben’s version of the concept, inoperosity 
is connected with a specific account of passivity, as a subtractive rather than 
destructive mode of negation, and with a specific account of the end of history, 
not as bringing it to an end, but as stopping it in its tracks.73 This reminds of 
Benjamin’s concept of the messianic moment, as an emergency brake in the train 
of history.74 If Western thought has conceived of history as provided with a telos 
(actualizing the potential of the human form of life by transforming reality), if 
work has therefore been integral to the definition of the human, and if runaway 
capitalism can be regarded as the wildest incarnation of this ontology, then the 
messianic may entail and promote the opposite to operosity and acceleration. 
‘We need time, but a time of rupture, […] a time that suspends apparatuses of 
exploitation and domination – an “idle time”’.75 
 The problem, however, is how ‘idleness’, or inoperosity, is to be conceived.  
Passivity as mere patience, plain acceptation of the existent, is hardly a viable 
route if one does not count on metaphysical eschatologies. Yet, a tactical 
withdrawal followed by new affirmative practices, grounded on the vital forces 
of a new collective subject76 likely underestimates how life itself, its potentialities, 
are today key to value extraction, from gene technologies to intellectual work.  
This is why an appeal to passivity as passionateness is problematic – as recalled, 
affect and desire are crucial targets of dominative strategies.77  A dynamis that 
aspires to (a different type of) energeia is easily prone to capture. A ‘passive 
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politics’,78 then, should rather build on dynamis as non-translation; on the 
protection and nurturing of impotentiality – the potential of not be and not do.
This is Agamben’s well-known argument; an argument that has attracted as 
much interest (for its refraining from the bandwagon of affirmative biopolitics) 
as criticism (for its apparent condemnation to sterility). Surely, it is difficult to 
devise how subtraction and disengagement may lead to a different world. The 
workerist case for a withdrawal from work, or the myriad attempts at building 
alternative forms of community organization and material flows, away from 
the circulations of global capitalism (farmers’ markets, community supported 
agriculture, food policy councils, community energy initiatives, the ‘new 
domesticity’ of crafting and making, etc.) can be regarded as tentative instances 
of a politics of inoperosity. Yet, if and how these experiences could take real 
momentum is obscure – they could even result functional to reconstituting the 
substrate of sociality that capital needs but is unable to produce. Theoretically, 
the main difficulty is to articulate St. Paul’s idea of a life lived in the form of the 
‘as not’; to give a more discernible outline of the post-messianic condition, where 
‘everything will be as is now, just a little different’.79
Conclusion
In this paper I addressed the question of the endless expansion of debt in 
terms of a messianic temporality governed by an homeopathic kathecon, 
whose pace is that of an engine running idle at growing speed. The preceding 
considerations, which are nothing more than a first exploration of the issue, 
end with the question of how can the present remain the same yet become 
also different, slightly – but crucially – ‘displaced’.80 I don’t think any regulatory 
intervention on money can be decisive. The key, if there is any, is likely to reside 
in the relationship with things, and with ourselves as (self-)governable beings. 
Debt ultimately depends on property relations, so addressing the former entails 
addressing the latter.
 Not only Agamben,81 but a burgeoning literature on the commons, 
is working on the notion of ‘use’ as a picklock for dismantling the modern 
construction of property, as a volitional act of domination, an ‘incoercible 
tendency to expand oneself’.82 Of course, an appeal to use does not resolve 
anything, unless one overcomes its framing as a right the subject has over an 
object (including oneself). Yet, this is more easily said than done. If the grounds 
of an account of use outside law can be found once more in St. Paul,83 and if 
Franciscan ‘poverty’ similarly builds on a non-proprietary relation with things, 
as animals make use of what nature offers them according to their needs, the 
Franciscan notion of use is also at the origin of the voluntaristic account of the 
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relationship with things and money.84 Similarly, if the closest example we have 
today of a non-proprietary relation with things is how administrators make use 
of things they do not own,85 the administrative outlook on the government of 
things and people constitutes the template of modern forms of domination.
This problematic cannot of course be resolved here. What is clear is that the 
question of debt is inseparable from the question of work. For the reasons 
indicated, the accelerationist, post-humanist route can hardly offer a viable reply. 
More promising, in the present historical condition, is the direction to which 
Benjamin points: ‘A kind of labour which, far from exploiting nature, would help 
her give birth to the creations that now lie dormant in her womb’.86 To redeem 
our enslavement to debt we need to redeem our relation with the world.
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